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Abstract
Th   is paper shows that a “new wave of globalization,” involving extensive oﬀ  shoring, has raised both 
actual and perceived labor market insecurity in industrialized countries. Th   e paper analyzes various 
channels through which this new wave of globalization leads to economic insecurity. It emphasises 
the key role of overall macroeconomic conditions in determining the outcome of oﬀ  shoring. Th  e 
paper points out the inadequacies of various policy responses that industrialized countries have come 
up with so far and advocates urgent steps toward formulation of policies and erection of institutional 
structure more appropriate to confront the challenges of the new of globalization. 
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Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity in Industrialized 
Countries
William Milberg and Deborah Winkler1
1. Introduction
How can one dare speak of economic insecurity in the industrialized countries when the rate of per capita 
GDP in Germany is 120 times that in Uganda, the rate of unemployment in the U.S. is 1/10th of that in 
Nepal, or when the share of population below the poverty line in France is 1/10th of that in Zimbabwe? Th  e 
question itself indicates that economic insecurity is a relative phenomenon. Th   ose who are subject to a high 
risk of a sudden drop in income or wealth without adequate oﬀ  setting support are facing economic insecu-
rity, irrespective of nationality or location. Hacker (2006, p. 20) deﬁ  nes economic insecurity as “a psycho-
logical response to the possibility of hardship-causing economic loss.” He notes, however, that “a feeling of 
insecurity is not enough to say someone is insecure. Insecurity requires real risk that threatens real hardship.”
By many accepted measures—real wage growth, inequality, labor’s share of national income, the 
incidence of long-term unemployment, the number of workers displaced by foreign trade and investment—
“real” economic insecurity in industrialized countries increased in the past 15-20 years. Th   e period has also 
been one of rapid globalization, with international trade and capital ﬂ  ows reaching historic highs. Th  e  role 
of globalization in heightened economic insecurity has thus become a major topic of debate in the advanced 
countries. Th   roughout the paper we focus on six countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Th   ese countries represent a broad spectrum of the advanced industrialized 
world, and although all have expanded their exposure to international trade and investment they have not all 
experienced the same degree of increased economic insecurity. We also ﬁ  nd that the perception of economic 
insecurity is strong in these industrialized countries, especially in the US and in France.
Th   e risk from a high level of real—and perceived—economic insecurity in the industrialized 
countries is borne by both the government and private households. Household consumption and borrow-
ing patterns may reﬂ  ect the burden of risk on the household private sector. Th   is may partly depend on the 
private sector’s expectation of government policy. While rising economic insecurity has in some cases resulted 
in increased demand for state-provided social protection, these demands have met various responses from 
business and government on the grounds that they raise production costs and reduce a nation’s international 
competitiveness.2 Th   e new wave of economic insecurity has occurred in a variety of political contexts. Al-
though oﬀ  shoring3 has increased in all industrialized countries and raised the degree of economic insecurity 
on average across the OECD, economic security varies considerably across countries, largely depending on 
1 Th   e authors would like to thank Richard Kozul-Wright, Teresa Ghilarducci, Diana Alarcón, Marva Corley, Mariangela 
Parra and the research staﬀ   at UNDESA for comments on a preliminary draft.
2  See Rodrik (1997) on the increased demand for social protection.
3 Oﬀ  shoring is deﬁ  ned in this paper as the reallocation of production across various geographical locations to beneﬁ  t 
from low labour costs and low taxes. In large part, this process has been facilitated by fast technological innovations in 
telecommunication and low transportation costs. Th   e concept of comparative advantage has been redeﬁ  ned to place the 
emphasis on the ability of ﬁ  rms to “coordinate a geographically dispersed network of activities.” Levy (2005, p. 685).2   DESA Working Paper No. 87
the institutions in place. Th   e ILO index of economic security 
gives the following rankings for the six countries that are the 
focus of this paper4:
As we will see below, German ﬁ  rms have greater 
investments in oﬀ  shore production sites than the U.S., and 
France has a higher rate of unemployment than Japan. But 
since economic security is aﬀ  ected by the policies and institu-
tions that inﬂ  uence market outcomes, Germany has a higher 
economic security rank than the U.S., and France ranks higher 
than Japan. 
During the 1990s a good deal of research aimed at showing that technological change rather than 
trade had been the principal source of labor market churning in industrialized countries. Th   is paper revisits 
this debate in the light of the evolution of the world trading environment, involving emergence of new and 
larger trading nations in the developing world, development of sophisticated global supply chains driven 
by lead ﬁ  rms in industry, ﬁ  nancialization5 of the non-ﬁ  nancial corporate sector in the major countries, and 
implementation of a number of regional free trade agreements that lower trade barriers and extend property 
rights protection to foreign investors.
Th   is paper addresses three central questions. First, what has been the impact of globalization, and 
speciﬁ  cally oﬀ  shoring through trade and foreign investment, on economic insecurity in the industrialized 
countries? Second, what are the speciﬁ  c microeconomic and macroeconomic channels through which 
globalization impacts economic insecurity in these countries? Th   ird, what political responses have best 
addressed rising economic insecurity without inﬂ  icting damage on other countries and in particular on 
the low-income developing countries whose export performance has been bolstered by the new wave of 
globalized production?
Th   e main ﬁ  ndings of this paper are:
Since the mid-1970s most industrialized countries have experienced a rise in economic insecuri- • 
ty, and in many of them the burden of economic risk has shifted from the state and corporations 
to private households.
Th   ere are diﬀ  erent models of state-market relations with respect to economic insecurity, rang- • 
ing from the limited state role in the Anglo-Saxon model to a heavy state role in the Rhineland 
model and a hybrid model of “ﬂ  exicurity”6 in Denmark and a few others.
International trade and investment increasingly occur within global supply chains, which have  • 
reached a level of growth and depth to constitute a “new wave” of globalization in which trade 
4 Th   e index combines measures of job security and social security, where the former includes income security and “voice 
representation security” and the latter measures “access to basic needs infrastructure pertaining to health, education, 
dwelling, information and social protection.” See ILO (2004).
5 Th  e  term  ﬁ  nancialization is used to describe the growing inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions on economic 
growth and development both in the domestic and international markets. It refers to a qualitative change in the 
operational logic of corporations and business ﬁ  rms away from productive investment and into ﬁ  nancial investments 
where quick and larger proﬁ  ts can be realized (UN 2008: 2).
6 Th  e  term  ﬂ  exicurity has been used to designate a social security model that includes some ﬂ  exibility in the labour 
market for the hiring and ﬁ  ring of workers with high levels of support for displaced workers. It is a model that has been 
adopted by Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.
Table 1:







15 United Kingdom 0.74
18 Japan 0.72
25 United States 0.61
Source: ILO (2004).Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  3
and technology are inextricably linked to an extent not previously witnessed. Oﬀ  shoring would 
be unthinkable without low-cost information technology, and information technology would not 
be as low cost if not for the eﬀ  ective extension of global supply chains into low-wage countries.
Th   e new wave of globalization has created new sources of gains from trade and new channels  • 
for transmission of economic insecurity arising from trade and investment. Moreover, as sup-
ply chains extend to high-tech goods and higher-skill services, there are massive possibilities for 
future expansion of oﬀ  shoring, indicating that economic vulnerability will rise across all skill 
and education groups rather than falling entirely on low-skilled workers, as had been the case 
until recently.
Spreading and sustaining the beneﬁ  ts of oﬀ  shoring depend on the domestic reinvestment of eﬃ   - • 
ciency gains that oﬀ  shoring brings. While oﬀ  shoring has contributed to the rise in proﬁ  t’s share 
in the national income of most industrialized countries, they are also witnessing a fall in the 
investment rate, as percentage of both proﬁ  t and GDP. Non-ﬁ  nancial corporations are increas-
ingly using proﬁ  ts to raise dividend payments, share buybacks and purchase of other ﬁ  nancial 
assets, rather than making productive investment.
Denmark’s mix of labor market ﬂ  exibility, ample social protection and active labor market  • 
policies—so-called “ﬂ  exicurity”—has successfully raised economic security in that country 
despite globalization. Th   e U.S. labor market ﬂ  exibility, combined with relatively meager social 
protection in the face of rapid growth of imports from developing countries, has contributed 
to an unprecedented rise in income inequality and economic insecurity for a large share of the 
American population. 
Given the macroeconomic consequences of oﬀ  shoring, ﬂ  exicurity arrangements alone are likely  • 
to be insuﬃ   cient to sustain high levels of economic security in the industrialized world. Trade 
protection has largely been avoided, but other policies involving redistribution and channeling 
of gains from oﬀ  shoring to investment and growth are likely to be more important in the near 
future, as oﬀ  shoring expands beyond low-skilled manufacturing workers.
Finally, the provision of a solid and portable set of social protection elements does not reduce  • 
a nation’s trade competitiveness and in fact may raise it as increased worker security leads to 
greater possibilities for innovation and growth in productivity.
We begin with an overview of recent trends in economic insecurity and the diﬀ  erent policy regimes 
in industrialized countries. Th   en we consider in detail how globalization and oﬀ  shoring might have contrib-
uted to rising economic insecurity. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of combining creative 
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in order to provide more security even as economic openness 
continues to grow.
2. Economic Insecurity in Industrialized Countries
Th   e period from 1950 to 1973 is widely referred to as the “Golden Age” of capitalism, but it may better be 
termed as the period of rising economic security for people in the industrialized countries. Not only did the 
OECD countries experience rapid growth in real GDP, but this growth was reﬂ  ected in rising median wages, 
even more rapid improvements in median family income, relatively low rates of unemployment, falling in-
equality, and improvements in the post-Great- Depression system of social protection in most countries. 4   DESA Working Paper No. 87
Since 1973 the industrialized economies have grown more slowly, as productivity growth has di-
minished. As can be seen from Table 2, all six countries in our sample had higher GDP growth rates during 
1950-1973 than during 1980-2007. In some cases (for example, Japan, Germany and France) the growth 
rate fell by more than half. Labor productivity growth follows a similar pattern. Over the entire OECD, total 
factor productivity growth fell to 1.5% per annum on average after 1985, from rates more than twice that 
during the twenty years before 1973.7
Th   e productivity growth slowdown occurred as the process of deindustrialization continued in 
all countries of our sample except Germany, and in many cases the pace of deindustrialization accelerated 
(see Figure 1).8 Manufacturing now accounts for between 12% and 15% of total value added in the U.S., 
U.K., Denmark and France. Th   e two trends are not unrelated, as productivity in services, while diﬃ   cult 
to measure, is widely recognized to be lower than productivity in manufacturing. Th   us the increase in the 
importance of services in economic activity relative to manufacturing contributed to reductions in economy-
wide rates of productivity growth. By some accounts manufacturing output growth is the main driver of 
productivity growth, following the so-called Verdoorn’s Law.9 Moreover, the manufacturing sector tradition-
ally oﬀ  ered jobs with high pay and employment protection, often the result of eﬀ  ective bargaining by labor 
unions. Service sector jobs vary in their skill requirement and pay, but generally oﬀ  er lower wages and less 
job security and employee beneﬁ  ts, partly due to low rates of unionization in services industries, an issue 
we return to below. As the share of services sector has grown in employment and value added, productivity 
growth has fallen, certainly as compared to that in the “Golden Age”.
7  Howell (2005), Table 3.2.
8  According to Kalmbach et al. (2005), the German data overstate the size of the manufacturing sector because many 
services are counted in manufacturing.
9  According to the Dutch economist Jake Verdoorn, faster output growth is associated with an increase in productivity 
due to increasing returns to scale. 
Table 2:
Economic Performance, Golden Age versus Post-Golden Age
(Compound annual growth rates, in percentage, unless otherwise indicated)
Denmark France Germany Japan UK US
Gross Domestic Product
1950-1973 3.8 5.0 6.0 9.3 2.9 3.9
1980-2007 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0
Labor Productivity
1950-1973 2.9 4.7 4.7 7.5 2.4 2.3
1980-2007 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.1 1.6
Employment-to-Population-Ratio Average
1960-1973 48.5 41.0 45.1 48.1 45.4 38.9
1980-2007 50.9 40.2 45.9 49.9 44.8 47.4
Unemployment Rate Average
1956-1973 1.1* 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.8 5.0
1980-2006 7.2 10.1 7.6 3.3 7.9 6.2
Source: Authors’ illustrations based on data from the Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total 
Economy Database, January 2008 and OECD Labor Force Statistics. 
*Average based on 1960, 1965, 1967, 1969-1973Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  5
A. Unemployment and Inequality
More importantly for the purposes of this paper, the post-1973 period has seen a signiﬁ  cant increase in 
worker vulnerability in many industrialized countries. Th   e average rate of unemployment (on a standard-
ized basis) has been signiﬁ  cantly higher in the post-Golden Age era compared to the rates of the 1956-1973 
period. Th   e extent of rise varies, ranging from slightly higher in the U.S. to more than ﬁ  ve times higher in 
France, Germany and Denmark (see Table 2). In most cases, the incidence of long-term unemployment (that 
is, unemployment of duration greater than one year) also rose (Figure 2).10
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Figure 1:
Share of Manufacturing in Value Added, 1970-2006 (Percentage)











Denmark France Germany Japan United Kingdom United States
1991 2006
Figure 2:
Share of Long-Term Unemployed (> 1 Year) in Total Unemployed (Percentage)
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics.6   DESA Working Paper No. 87
Th   e slowdown in GDP and productivity growth described above not only brought higher rates 
of unemployment, but occurred along with a slowdown in the growth of wages. In the U.S., real median 
wages have been eﬀ  ectively stagnant since the late 1970s.11 Th   e result of these trends is that beginning in 
the 1980s, the labor share of national income began to fall across many industrialized countries. Since most 
labor force participants are not owners of capital, this trend in the labor share captures in a broad way the 
growing economic insecurity in the industrialized countries.
Even more dramatic than the rise in income 
inequality between wage earners and proﬁ  t earners 
was the rise in inequality across wage earnings, and 
especially in the gap between the wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers. Th   e rise in “wage inequality” has 
been much discussed and is documented for our six-
country sample in Table 3, which shows the ratio of 
wages in the top decile to wages in the bottom decile 
of the wage distribution for 1985, 1991 and 2005. 
Over the entire period, the inequality has been the 
greatest in the US and the lowest in Denmark. Since 
1985, France and Japan were the only countries not 
to experience an increase in inequality. In the other 
four countries, inequality began to rise after 1991, 
more pronouncedly in the U.S. and Germany. 
B. Th   e Burden of Risk
Th   ere are private and public responses to rising economic insecurity of workers. Households may borrow in 
order to insulate their spending patterns from earnings volatility. Th   e rise in home equity loans in the U.S. 
and consumer credit in the U.K. are in part explained by such responses.12 Rates of household saving out of 
disposable income fell during the 1990s for most of the countries in our sample (Germany and France being 
the exceptions), indicating the need for households to limit savings in order to maintain their consumption 
level (OECD, 2007a).
Government responses to economic insecurity also vary greatly. Th   e U.S. response was to privatize 
the burden of health insurance and pensions (see below). In other countries, there was a decline in 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts (Table 4). Among the countries of the sample, only Denmark and France increased 
spending (as percent of GDP) on active labor market programs since 1990, though in France the percentage 
has declined after 2000 (Table 4). Responding to the rising economic insecurity, governments have also 
made changes in regulations on hiring and ﬁ  ring. However these changes have gone in diﬀ  erent directions, 
becoming less strict in Denmark, Germany and Japan, and stricter in France and to some extent in the U.K. 
(Table 5).
11  Temin and Levy (2007).
12  Taylor et al. (2005) ﬁ  nd that the deterioration in the U.S. current account between 1995 and 2003 closely tracks the 
rise in health care spending by Americans. Th   is indicates that Americans were not so obviously on a whimsical buying 
spree, as is so often claimed, but instead were trying to retain spending in the face of stagnant real wages and rapidly 
rising costs of health care.
Table 3: 
Wage Inequality, 1985-2005
(Ratio of wages of top 10 percent of earners
to bottom 10 percent of earners)
1985 1991 2005
Denmark 2.2 2.2 2.6
France 3.1 3.3 2.9
Germany 2.9 2.8 3.3
Japan 3.1 3.1 3.1
United Kingdom 3.2 3.4 3.6
United States 4.1 4.3 4.9
Source: Wages per full-time employee are calculated based on 
OECD Labor Force Statistics.
Note: 1985 wages only for West Germany. 1990 wages for 
Denmark, 2004 wages for France.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  7
More important than shifting the burden of risk are diﬀ  erences across countries in terms of the 
degree of labor market ﬂ  exibility, level of unemployment beneﬁ  ts, spending on active labor market programs 
and the level of pension beneﬁ  ts. Economic insecurity is higher where state protection is lower and/or social 
protection is more closely tied with employment. By looking at these three variables—strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation, gross unemployment replacement rate, and public expenditures on active labor 
market programs, –we see some clear patterns in the government response to economic insecurity. We calcu-
lated an index of the strictness of employment legislation by setting the U.S. level of employment protection 
level as the base and calculating the relative levels for other countries. Similarly, we constructed an index of 
“labor support” by again taking the U.S. level of gross unemployment replacement rate and public expendi-
ture on active labor market programs as the base. A scatter plot of these two indexes is given in Figure 3. We 
next combine these two indexes, giving equal weights to each, into a single index. 
Based on the values of these indexes, ﬁ  ve distinct “models” emerge and they follow closely the 
groupings presented in Boeri (2002). On the lower left corner we can identify an “Anglo-Saxon model” 
Table 4:
 Labor Market Policy Indicators
Public Expenditures for Active Labor Market Programmes  (percentage of GDP) 1980 1990 2000 2003
Denmark 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.6
France n.a. 0.8 1.3 1.1
Germany n.a. 1.0 1.1 1.1
Japan n.a. 0.3 0.2 0.3
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5
United States 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate (percentage) 1981 1991 2001 2005
Denmark 54.2 51.9 50.9 48.9
France 31.3 37.6 43.5 39.0
Germany 29.3 28.8 29.4 24.2
Japan 8.8 9.9 9.1 7.7
United Kingdom 24.2 17.8 16.6 15.6
United States 14.6 11.1 13.5 13.5
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD Social Expenditures and OECD Tax-Beneﬁ  t Models. 
Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate: Th   e OECD summary measure is deﬁ  ned as the average of the gross 
unemployment beneﬁ  t replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of 
unemployment. For further details, see OECD (1994) chapter 8, and Martin J. (1996)  Pre-2003 data have been 
revised.
Table 5:
Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation
(Higher values indicate stricter regulation on hiring and fi  ring)
1990 1998 2003
Denmark 2.3 1.4 1.4
France 2.7 3.0 3.1
Germany 3.2 2.5 2.2
Japan 2.1 2.0 1.8
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.8
United States 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: OECD Labor Statistics. 
Info on EPL: Th   e OECD uses the term 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
in the context of employment protection 
legislation generally. It refers to all types of 
employment protection measures, whether 
grounded primarily in legislation, court 
rulings, collectively bargained conditions of 
employment or customary practice (http://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3535).8   DESA Working Paper No. 87
of low levels of regulation on hiring and ﬁ  ring and low levels of worker support. To this corner belong the 
U.S, the U.K., Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. Countries on the lower right corner follow the 
“Mediterranean model” that combines relatively strict employment legislation and low levels of worker sup-
port. Th   is group includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Norway. Countries on the upper right corner of 
the scatter plot—“the Rhineland model”—combine relatively strict employment protection legislation and 
high levels of worker support. To this corner belong France, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany. In the upper 
left corner are countries with relatively ﬂ  exible labor markets and high levels of worker support. We call this 
the “ﬂ  exicurity model,” and its followers include Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands.
Japan has always been diﬃ   cult to categorize in these schemes because although the state supports 
only low levels of labor market and social protection, the private sector had traditionally supported long-
term employment security. We would propose an “East Asian model” including Japan and Korea, both of 
which have greater employment protection than those in the Anglo-Saxon group in Figure 3. It would seem 
that the traditional role of the private sector in Japan has vanished to a great extent, as seen by the increase to 
European levels of Japanese long-term unemployment and involuntary part-time employment.
Th  e  ﬂ  exicurity model has attracted a lot of attention because of a superior Danish performance in 
trade and employment and the unusual combination of policies, with ﬂ  exibility in terms of hiring and ﬁ  ring 
and strong social protection for those seeking employment, including a high level of unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
and considerable levels of spending on active labor market programs.13 Moreover, Denmark greatly exceeds 
other countries in terms of pension beneﬁ  ts relative to lifetime earnings (Figure 4). Th   is system of ﬂ  exicurity 
is in part the reason for Denmark’s attainment of a high level of economic security.













































 Strictness of Employment Legislation vs. Labor Support in OECD countries, 2003 (Indexes, USA=1)
Source: Authors’ illustrations, Data: OECD (2005), OECD Social Expenditures and OECD Tax-Beneﬁ  t Models. 
NB: Th   e Strictness of Employment Legislation Index has been calculated indexing the USA=1, i.e. dividing the values of all other 
countries by the US value. Higher values indicate stricter regulation on hiring and ﬁ  ring. Labor support is an index (using equal 
weights) composed of the indexed (USA=1) Active Labor Market Expenditures (as % of GDP) as well as the indexed (USA=1) Gross 
Unemployment Replacement Rate. Higher values indicate a higher security level. Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate: Th  e 
OECD summary measure is deﬁ  ned as the average of the gross unemployment beneﬁ  t replacement rates for two earnings levels, 
three family situations and three durations of unemploymentGlobalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  9
By many measures economic security is the lowest in the U.S., and this is supported by the unusu-
ally high perception of insecurity and fear of globalization in the U.S. discussed in the next section. Th  e 
U.S., often lauded for the ﬂ  exibility of its labor markets, also stands out in terms of its low levels of unem-
ployment beneﬁ  ts and limited state spending on active labor market programs (Table 4). Moreover, over the 
past twenty years, the U.S. has experienced a dramatic shift in the burden of risk, from government to the 
households themselves. Th   is has resulted from more volatile household income, increase in health insur-
ance costs, a greater reliance on private (as opposed to public) pensions, and a continuation of government 
policies of low levels of unemployment beneﬁ  ts. Hacker (2006) describes these changes as “the great risk 
shift,” as governments and employers shifted the burden of insuring against a rapid decline in income to the 
employees and households themselves. In their long-term historical analysis of the U.S. income distribution, 
Temin and Levy (2007) argue that this deterioration of the social safety net, combined with the decline of 
other institutions such as trade unions, has been a source of the decoupling of growth of productivity and 
growth of wages:
“[…] the recent impacts of technology and trade have been ampliﬁ  ed by the collapse of these 
institutions, a collapse which arose because economic forces led to a shift in the political environ-
ment over the 1970s and 1980s. If our interpretation is correct, no rebalancing of the labor force 
can restore a more equal distribution of productivity gains without government intervention and 
changes in private sector behaviour (Temin and Levy 2007, p. 5).”
As an indication of the changes in 
the U.S., Table 5 shows union density in our 
sample countries since 1980, with the U.S. 
experiencing by far the greatest decline. Th  e 
U.K., following a similar model, comes next, 
though unionization in the UK even in 2001 
remained at a much higher level than in the 
U.S.. France’s low rate of unionization would 
seem to be deceptive, since bargaining cover-
age of union agreements has remained very 
broad.
83.6 51.2 39.9 36.8 34.4 43.6
Denmark France Germany Japan United Kingdom United States
Figure 4:
Gross Pension Replacement Rates by Earnings Based on 2004 Rules (Percentage of median earnings)
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD pension models. OECD (2006) pp. 33-34. 
NB: For median income earner.  Th  e  ﬁ  gures are “estimates of the level of pension people will receive if they work for a full career and 
if today’s pension rules stay unchanged.”
Table 5:
Union Members as share of Total Labor Force (Percentage)
Union Members / Total Labor Force
1980 1991 2001
Denmark 60 61 63
France 14 8 8
G e r m a n y 2 93 01 9
Japan 22 19 17
United Kingdom 43 30 26
United States 18 13 11
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD Trade Union Statistics, 
based on administrative data except for United Kingdom 2001 and 
United States 1991 and 2001 (survey data).1 0   DESA Working Paper No. 87
Th   e U.S. also stands out in the area of health insurance. Th   e U.S. is alone among our sample coun-
tries in not having universal health insurance coverage. Th   ere were 47 million people uninsured in 2005 
in the U.S., reﬂ  ecting a steady increase in the number (and percentage) of people uninsured since the late 











Denmark France Germany Japan United Kingdom United States
Social/Government Private
Figure 5:
Government and Private Health Insurance Coverage in 2005 ( Percentage of Population)
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD Health Data. Social health insurance data includes government and social health 
insurance data. 
France: Private insurance data for 2004. Japan: Governmental/social insurance data for 2004, private insurance data not 
available. United States: Private insurance data for 1995 and 2000 from U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics 


























































































































































































































Number of uncovered Percentage of Uncovered
Figure 6:
Number of People without Health Insurance in the US
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1988 to 2007 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements. Th   e number of people reported as of March of the following year. U.S. Census Bureau (2007), p.58.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  1 1
C. Perceptions of Economic Insecurity
Popular perceptions of economic insecurity do not necessarily reﬂ  ect objective measures of insecurity, but 
we ﬁ  nd a generally high level of fear towards globalization among our sample countries and especially in the 
U.S. and France. According to the German Marshall Fund (2007), 34% of Americans and 38% of Euro-
peans had a negative view of globalization. About half of Americans and Europeans think that “freer trade” 
results in more job loss than job creation. Between 2005 and 2007 American sentiment turned more against 
freer trade while European sentiment became less skeptical of the employment beneﬁ  ts of trade liberaliza-
tion. Half of Americans and a slightly higher percentage of Europeans “saw the growth of China’s economy 
as a threat.” Across countries, the survey showed that the U.S. and France show the most skepticism toward 
international trade and investment (see Figure 7). Of all countries surveyed, these two showed the high-
est proportion of respondents, 40 percent in the US and 36 percent in France, who “did not favor FDI.” 
Th   is contrasted with 69% of English and German respondents who favored FDI.14 Adverse attitude toward 
globalization went along with pessimism regarding future. In the U.S., 40% expect the next generation will 
have a lower standard of living, 62% said job security had declined, and 59% said they have to work harder 
to earn a decent living. Most striking, 75% said that “outsourcing work overseas hurts American workers.”15 
While this expression of greater economic insecurity was the greatest among those with less education, ex-
pressions of higher economic insecurity were found for all educational categories.16 
14  Note that Scheve and Slaughter (2001) ﬁ  nd that in the UK over 1991-1999 that perceived economic insecurity was 
higher in those sectors with greater outward FDI.
15  Anderson and Gascon (2007), p. 1
16  Even on the issue of perception of insecurity, there is conﬂ  icting evidence. Kierkegaard (2007, p. 11) shows that among 
European countries there is not a statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between “public anxiety” over oﬀ  shoring (as 


























Favor foreign companies investing in our country
Agree that trade costs more jobs than it creates
Agree that freer trade leads to more social and economic
inequality in our country.
Agree that freer trade puts our country at a disadvantage
because of our high labor and environmental standards
Agree that the Chinese economy represents a threat.
France Germany United Kingdom United States
Source: German Marshall Fund (2007), Topline Data October 2007.
Figure 7: Concerns about Free Trade (in percentage of Respondents)1 2   DESA Working Paper No. 87
Th   e contrast between perceptions of globalization in France and Denmark is clear from a recent 
survey that asked “what comes ﬁ  rst to mind when you hear the word ‘globalisation’? Fifty-seven percent of 
French respondents said that the word ‘globalisation’ evoked the “relocation of some companies to countries 
where labor is cheaper.” Among Danes, 47% responded that globalization evoked “opportunities for national 
companies in terms of new outlets” (Figure 8).
3. The “New Wave” of Globalized Production
Th   e international trading environment has changed over the last 20 years during which economic insecurity 
has increased in the industrialized world. Th   e changes reﬂ  ect political, economic and technological changes 
that have together encouraged more international trade and foreign investment, altered the structure 
of trade, and changed the relationship between trade and foreign direct investment. Expansion of trade 
during this period has occurred increasingly through sophisticated global value chains, as companies in 
industrialized countries went oﬀ  shore to perform both manufacturing and services, while retaining in home 
countries “core competencies” related to marketing, ﬁ  nance, R&D and design. Th   is type of division of 
labor has resulted in greater reliance on imports from low-income countries. It is true that these changes 
in the international economy began decades ago and have spread gradually, so that we are not witnessing 
a sudden shift in economic relations. However, the internationalization of production has deepened in 
such a way in the past 20 years that it is possible to designate this period as one heralding a “new wave” of 
globalization, involving both quantitative and qualitative shifts in the role of international trade. Economists 
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Figure 8:
 The Perception of Globalization (in percentage of Respondents)
Question: “There are multiple consequences of the globalisation of trade. When you hear the world 
‘globalisation’, what comes fi  rst to mind?”
Source: European Commission (2007).Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  13
services.17 Levy (2005, p. 685) sees oﬀ  shoring as driven not by comparative advantage but by ﬁ  rms’ ability 
to “coordinate a geographically dispersed network of activities.” He notes that oﬀ  shoring “decouples the 
linkages between economic value creation and geographic location.” Higher imports of cheap inputs lower 
production costs considerably and raise proﬁ  ts of the lead ﬁ  rm, thus contributing to the rising share of 
corporate proﬁ  ts in national income. After a brief discussion of the factors that have driven this new wave of 
globalization, we then turn to an analysis of the variety of linkages between this new wave of globalization 
and economic insecurity.
A. Political, Technological and Economic Factors
Politically, perhaps the most signiﬁ  cant development of this period was the entry into the capitalist world 
economy of former-Communist and other largely-closed economies. Th   e collapse of the Soviet Union and 
of communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, China’s evolution towards a market economy, and 
even the opening and liberalization of India’s economy, have all served to expand global productive capacity, 
international trade, foreign investment and international subcontracting. Freeman (2007) has character-
ized these developments as “the great doubling” of the world capitalist system’s labor force, as they added 
1.3 billion people to the pool of labor seeking work under competitive conditions. Such an expansion of 
labor supply alone, Freeman argues, is enough to dampen wage growth in the rest of the world, including 
the industrialized countries. When such a labor supply “shock” occurs in a period of slower demand growth 
compared to the “Golden Age” period of 1950-1973, the eﬀ  ect on labor markets around the world is likely 
to be signiﬁ  cant. 
A second, and related, political development has been the rise in the number of trade agreements, 
covering more countries than ever in history. Hundreds of bilateral investment treaties have been signed, 
and numerous regional trade agreements have gone into eﬀ  ect. Th   ese agreements have contributed to 
the ongoing process of tariﬀ   reduction and removal of non-tariﬀ   barriers, aiding at the same time the 
globalization of production by providing protection to foreign investors. Meanwhile, the WTO has 
quintupled its membership over the original GATT. As part of this broad liberalization process, many 
developing countries switched from import substitution policies to export promotion, using a growing 
network of international supply chains. For example, export processing zones have expanded in scope and 
number, oﬀ  ering foreign ﬁ  rms long tax holidays on corporate proﬁ  ts and/or unrestricted proﬁ  t repatriation.18 
Th   ese regulatory changes generally increased economic security of ﬁ  rms while raising the vulnerability of 
workers in developed countries.
Rapid progress in electronic communication has facilitated the massive expansion of supply chains 
internationally, with lead ﬁ  rms investing abroad or subcontracting with foreign producers in order to reduce 
costs of production and/or better serve local markets. As supply chains developed and supplier ﬁ  rms gained 
in technological sophistication and scale of operations, the dichotomy between in-house or arm’s-length 
international supply relations has given way to a multiplicity of lead ﬁ  rm/supplier ﬁ  rm relations involving 
various degrees of investment, technical support, long-term contracting and monitoring. In some cases, large 
supplier ﬁ  rms—especially in autos, apparel, electronics and services—have captured scale economies and 
developed modular production systems, enabling them to produce a range of related products, and allowing 
them to supply inputs and ﬁ  nished goods to many companies within a given sector and sometimes across 
17  Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2007), p. 60.
18  See Milberg (2007a) for an overview of the expansion of EPZs in the 2000s.1 4   DESA Working Paper No. 87
sectors.19 In many cases, however, continual entry of new developing country supplier ﬁ  rms has resulted in 
global excess capacity, declining terms of trade for developing countries’ manufacturers, and enhancing the 
scope for lead ﬁ  rms to induce competition among supplier ﬁ  rms, further lowering lead ﬁ  rm input costs.20
B. International Trade and Investment
Th   e end result of the political, technological and economic factors described above is the rapid expansion of 
world trade relative to world output. Tables 6a and b show the trade shares of goods and services for the six 
countries under review. Since 1991, all countries have expanded their exports and imports relative to GDP. 
Germany recently overtook the U.S. as the largest goods exporter, a feat that is especially impressive given 
the size of the U.S. economy compared to that of Germany. Th   e U.S. imports however remain more than 
double those of the next highest importer. Th   ough the U.S. has the highest value of exports and imports 
of total goods and services, it has the lowest ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP. Trade in services, 
while at much lower levels in terms of value, has expanded faster in many cases. In 2005, the U.S. ran a $62 
billion surplus in services, while Germany ran a $48 billion deﬁ  cit.
19  On the variety of forms of lead ﬁ  rm-supplier relations, see Gereﬃ    et al. (2005). For a discussion of “modularity” in 
global supply chains, see Sturgeon (2002). For a study of scale economies in ﬁ  rst-tier suppliers, see Gereﬃ    (2006).
20  Milberg (2004) calls this the “endogenous asymmetry of market structures in global supply chains.” On the terms 
of trade issue, see recent papers on the “fallacy of composition” in manufacturers export expansion including Mayer 
(2003) and Blecker and Razmi (2006).
Tables 6a-b:
Exports and Imports of Commodities and Services
Commodities Exports Imports Balance
(in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP) (in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP) (in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP)
1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005
Denmark 37.7 83.3 27.6 32.2 34.3 75.0 25.1 29.0 3.5 8.3 2.5 3.2
France 213.4 434.4 17.2 20.4 230.8 476.0 18.6 22.4 -17.4 -41.6 -1.4 -2.0
Germany 402.7 977.8 22.3 35.0 389.1 777.4 21.5 27.8 13.6 200.4 0.8 7.2
Japan 314.5 594.9 9.2 13.0 236.7 515.9 6.9 11.3 77.8 79.1 2.3 1.7
United Kingdom 182.2 384.4 17.6 17.5 209.8 515.8 20.3 23.5 -27.6 -131.4 -2.7 -6.0
United States 421.7 904.3 7.1 7.2 509.2 1,732.3 8.5 13.8 -87.5 -828.0 -1.5 -6.6
Source: Authors’ illustrations, Data: OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
CD-ROM via UNCTAD.
Services Exports   Imports Balance Balance
(in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP) (in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP) (in Bn. USD) (in % of GDP)
1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005 1991 2005
Denmark 14.3 36.3 10.4 14.0 10.4 33.4 7.6 12.9 3.8 2.9 2.8 1.1
France 80.1 116.0 6.5 5.5 63.7 106.1 5.1 5.0 16.4 9.9 1.3 0.5
Germany 64.1 154.9 3.5 5.5 90.0 202.9 5.0 7.3 -25.9 -47.9 -1.4 -1.7
Japan 44.8 110.2 1.3 2.4 86.6 134.3 2.5 2.9 -41.8 -24.0 -1.2 -0.5
United Kingdom 56.3 203.1 5.4 9.2 49.0 160.5 4.7 7.3 7.3 42.6 0.7 1.9
United States 162.6 376.8 2.7 3.0 118.1 314.6 2.0 2.5 44.5 62.2 0.7 0.5
Source: Authors’ calculations, Data: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of Payments, CD-ROM via UNCTAD. *2004 
imports and exports for Denmark.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  15
Th   e expansion of world trade in the past 10-15 years has occurred, to a great extent, within supply 
chains, which can take the form of either multinational corporations (leading to intra-ﬁ  rm trade) or arm’s-
length relations between buyer and supplier. Evidence shows that both forms of supply chains have expanded 
since the 1980s. Th   e share of world FDI going to low- and medium-wage countries has grown steadily since 
the mid-1970s. At the same time, the share of intra-ﬁ  rm trade in industrialized country imports has re-
mained relatively constant, indicating that the arm’s-length channel has retained its competitive appeal.21 
Foreign investment patterns have also changed. Traditionally, foreign investment was considered a 
substitute for international trade and a means for “tariﬀ   hopping”. Today, foreign direct investment and trade 
are complementary, since FDI leads to input trade within global supply chains. In addition, globalization of 
production has reduced, to some extent, domestic investment in the industrialized countries, since consider-
able production activity now takes place oﬀ  shore. Taking the process to its extreme, many lead ﬁ  rms in the 
supply chains have divested entirely from manufacturing. All countries in our sample have seen a decline in 
the ratio of domestic investment to GDP since the mid-1980s. During the same period, the investment-to-
GDP ratio has ballooned in China, a point we discuss in more detail below. 
C. Oﬀ  shoring of Goods and Services
Th   e growth in trade and FDI over the past 20 years is not simply a quantitative shift. It reﬂ  ects a structural 
shift led by the accelerated growth of sophisticated supply chains. Th   ere has been a rise in oﬀ  shoring by ﬁ  rms 
in the industrialized countries. Table 7 presents recent data for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S, showing that 
goods and services produced in oﬀ  shore production sites measured as the share of imported inputs in total 
(non-energy) inputs, rose in the 1990s. Goods produced oﬀ  shore account for almost 30% of input use in the 
U.K., 23% in Germany and over 17% in the U.S. In case of Germany and the U.S., these levels reﬂ  ect slow 
but steady growth in the reliance on imported inputs, growing by about 50% over 1992-2004. For services, 
the ratio of imported to total input is still low, ranging between 8 and 3 percent, but the rates of growth are 
higher than those for goods in all the three countries mentioned above. A number of recent studies indicate 
that oﬀ  shoring of services is likely to expand more rapidly in future than that of goods.22
Th  e  ﬁ  gures in Table 7 measure trade in inputs and thus may understate the magnitude of trade 
within global supply chains. Global corporations in the major industrialized countries are not strictly in-
volved in assembly. Much of the import activity in global supply chains is in fully ﬁ  nished goods. In fact, the 
purpose of corporate oﬀ  shoring, whether at arm’s-length or through foreign subsidiaries, is precisely to allow 
the corporation to focus on its “core competence,” while leaving other aspects of the process, often including 
production, to others. 
Many “manufacturing” ﬁ  rms now do not manufacture anything at all. Th   ey merely provide product 
and brand design, marketing, supply chain logistics and ﬁ  nancial management services. Th   us an alternative 
proxy for oﬀ  shoring may simply be imports from low-wage countries. As shown in Table 8, Japan and the 
U.S. now rely heavily on imports from low-income developing countries (29% and 22% respectively). While 
the analogous ratios for them are still low, all the European countries have seen in recent years a more than 
doubling of the share of their imports coming from low-income developing countries (see column marked 
“low-income” in Table 8). Th   e new wave of globalized production can be put in some historical perspective 
by considering imports from all developing and transitional economies since 1950, as also shown in Table 8. 
21  On the location of FDI, see Burke and Epstein (2001) and on intra-ﬁ  rm trade, see Milberg (2004).
22  For some historical data on oﬀ  shoring, see Campa and Goldberg (1997).1 6   DESA Working Paper No. 87
In 1950, these shares were especially high in countries with colonial ties, such as France, the UK, and the US, 
and also in Germany. Th   e shares declined for some countries during 1950-1970 and 1970-1991, but showed 
considerable rise during 1991-2005, reaching 16% in Denmark, 20% in France, 24% in Germany, 26% in 
the U.K., 54% in the U.S. and 68% in Japan.
Table 7: 
Off  shoring Intensity in Germany, the UK, and the US 1992-2004 
(Imported Inputs as percentage of Total Non-Energy Inputs)
Goods Off  shoring Intensity
Year Germany United Kingdom United States
1992 - 28.2 11.7
1993 - 29.5 12.7
1994 - 29.8 13.4
1995 12.2 30.7 14.2
1996 12.2 30.7 14.3
1997 14.8 29.7 14.6
1998 14.6 28.0 14.9
1999 15.4 28.0 15.6
2000 19.5 28.6 17.3
2001 19.9 28.1 -
2002 19.7 - -
2003 20.5 - -
2004 23.1 - -
Growth 92-00* 59.1% 1.3% 47.9%
Service Off  shoring Intensity
Year Germany United Kingdom United States
1992 1.0* 1.4 0.2
1993 1.0** 1.6 0.2
1994 0.9** 1.6 0.2
1995 1.0 1.6 0.2
1996 1.1 1.8 0.2
1997 1.2 1.7 0.2
1998 1.4 2.0 0.2
1999 1.7 2.2 0.3
2000 2.0 2.4 0.3
2001 2.3 2.6 -
2002 2.2 - -
2003 2.1 - -
2004 2.1 - -
Growth 92-00 100.0% 76.3% 61.1%
Source: Authors’ calculations for Germany. Data: input-output tables, Federal Statistical Oﬃ   ce. 
*1995-2000 for Germany. ** German service oﬀ  shoring intensities from 1992 to 1994 use unrevised input-
output data. Service oﬀ  shoring intensity=∑s [(input purchases of service s by sector i)t/(total non energy 
inputs used by sector i)t]* [(imports of service s)t/(productionst + importsst - exportsst). Weighted average 
across all sectors i by outputs at time t. Goods oﬀ  shoring intensity is calculated equivalently.
Calculations for the UK: Amiti and Wei (2005). Data: input-output tables, UK National Statistics, IMF: 
Balance of Payments Statistics. NB: UK data is not directly available, but can be reconstructed from Figure 
2 in Amiti and Wei (2005). Calculations for the US: Amiti and Wei (2006). Data: input-output tables, US 
National Statistics, IMF: Balance of Payments Statistics.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  17
China is the export powerhouse, hosting much of the oﬀ  shoring activity, and India’s boom in busi-
ness services exports has now received much attention. China’s export to industrialized countries has been 
growing remarkably, especially in the past ten years, reaching 10% of total OECD imports in 2005, and 
continuing to grow since then (Figure 9). In 2006, the U.S. ran a $235 billion deﬁ  cit with China, based on 
imports of $287 billion and exports of $52 billion. Most of these imports were demanded directly by U.S. 
corporations, such as Wal-Mart, Nike and Mattel and a number of apparel, electronics and automotive com-
panies. About 25 percent of U.S. imports from China are “related party” imports, meaning they are between 
parties with at least a 5% common ownership interest. Th   ose without aﬃ   liates in China often order from 
large Chinese contract manufacturers or from vendors who subcontract to Chinese ﬁ  rms. In the electronics 
sector, Chinese production is dominated by foreign investors from Asia. 
Table 8:
Merchandise Imports by Region of Origin (Percentage of Total Imports)
Developed 







Denmark 1950 93.3 0.9 3.5 0.9 5.4 0.7
1970 88.4 4.5 3.4 2.6 10.5 1.1
1991 89.8 3.6 2.4 2.9 9.0 1.2
2005 84.4 4.7 2.8 6.3 13.8 1.7
France 1950 52.7 9.3 23.9 8.4 41.6 0.4
1970 77.2 5.8 8.2 6.8 20.8 1.7
1991 80.7 5.6 5.9 3.8 15.2 1.8
2005 78.8 4.7 6.3 6.0 17.0 3.2
Germany 1950 74.4 4.8 9.9 9.1 23.8 1.0
1970 79.5 6.6 6.5 4.5 17.6 2.8
1991 81.6 5.5 5.1 4.1 14.6 3.7
2005 76.2 5.0 5.0 8.6 18.6 5.2
Japan 1950 60.7 8.2 8.2 21.5 37.8 0.1
1970 54.4 13.4 15.3 14.1 42.9 2.6
1991 49.2 25.1 9.2 14.9 49.3 1.5
2005 32.5 26.5 10.4 29.2 66.2 1.4
United Kingdom 1950 58.3 8.4 12.5 14.6 35.5 1.8
1970 70.5 10.2 7.6 8.4 26.2 3.0
1991 84.3 6.6 4.4 3.0 14.1 1.0
2005 71.8 8.3 6.7 8.0 23.0 2.6
United States 1950 43.2 15.5 25.0 14.0 54.5 0.7
1970 72.6 14.0 7.6 5.2 26.8 0.5
1991 59.5 24.0 7.5 8.6 40.1 0.3
2005 46.2 22.0 8.7 21.8 52.5 1.3
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: UNCTAD. Handbook of Statistics.1 8   DESA Working Paper No. 87
4. Globalization and Economic Insecurity
A. Connecting Globalization to Economic Insecurity
All six countries of our sample experienced an increase in globalization (by various measures) in recent years, 
and in almost all cases our measures of economic insecurity also increased, most prominently in Germany, 
Japan and the U.S.. Two countries (Denmark and the U.K.) experienced declines in the share of long-term 
unemployment and also had the lowest growth in involuntary part-time work (see Table 9).
B. A Closer Look at Winners and Losers from Oﬀ  shoring
Trade liberalization is known to create winners and losers, and the new wave of globalization is no diﬀ  erent 
in this regard, although some of the mechanisms and distributional eﬀ  ects may be new. Figure 10 depicts the 
variety of ways in which oﬀ  shoring impacts the labor market. Oﬀ  shoring, on the one hand, lowers prices of 
inputs and outputs, raising the demand for both and thus the demand for labor too. In addition, lower input 
prices should raise proﬁ  t margins and proﬁ  ts, leading to investment that should further raise productivity and 
output. Th   ese gains are labeled as the “mark-up,” and “scale” eﬀ  ects in Figure 10. On the other hand, oﬀ  shor-
ing weakens labor demand by replacing foreign labor for domestic labor, creating a “substitution eﬀ  ect.” It 
also reduces demand for labor by raising productivity, an outcome referred to as the “productivity” eﬀ  ect.
Not the entire rise in proﬁ  ts is recycled into investment and labor demand, and this constitutes 
an important leakage in the system. As we will see below, corporations may also choose to return their net 
gains to shareholders, and this has occurred through higher dividend payments and share buybacks. Th  is 
strategy of ﬁ  nancialization of the non-ﬁ  nancial corporate sector also includes the purchase of ﬁ  nancial assets 
and the acquisition of other corporations (merger and acquisition). Financialization represents a drain on 
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Figure 9: 
OECD Goods Trade with China and India (as percentage of total OECD Goods Trade)
Source: OECD (2007c), pp.110. Data: United Nations, COMTRADE database.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  19
Figure 10 is a simpliﬁ  cation that considers all labor as one type, and leaves out some potentially 
signiﬁ  cant indirect eﬀ  ects. Th   us in addition to the direct eﬀ  ect of oﬀ  shoring on employment and proﬁ  ts, 
economic research has also considered the eﬀ  ect of oﬀ  shoring on diﬀ  erent types of labor (skilled and un-
skilled, through the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀ  ect), the increased sensitivity of labor demand to wage changes at 
home and abroad, and the greater use of company threats to move production abroad to undercut bargain-
ing power of unions and laborers. We brieﬂ  y review the evidence on each of these channels before looking at 
the overall relationship between globalization and economic insecurity in the industrialized countries.
Table 9:
Globalization vs. Economic Insecurity, 1991-2005 
(compound annual growth rate, unless otherwise indicated)
Globalization (1991-2005)




Imports from Low-Income 





Denmark 1.9% 0.7% 5.6% n.a. n.a.
France 1.3% 0.7% 3.3% n.a. n.a.
Germany 2.8% 1.2% 5.4% 7.3% 9.2%
Japan 2.8% 0.8% 4.9% n.a. n.a.
United Kingdom 1.3% 0.6% 7.3% 0.0% 7.6%
United States 2.0% 0.5% 6.8% 5.0% 6.1%
Economic Insecurity (1991-2005)
Share of Labor 
Compensation in GDP
Share of Involuntary Part-Time 
Workers in Total Employment
Share of Long-Term Unemployed 
in Total Unemployed
ILO Economic Security 
Index  2004 (Value)
Denmark -0.2% 1.1% -1.4% 0.91
France 0.0% 1.4%2 1.3% 0.83
Germany -0.6% 14.6% 3.9% 0.79
Japan -0.2% 12.4% 4.7% 0.72
United Kingdom -0.2% 0.5% -1.7% 0.74
United States -0.1% n.a. 4.6% 0.61
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD, UNCTAD, KOF Index of Globalization 2008 (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/), 
Federal Statistical Oﬃ   ce Germany, Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006).
1  CAGR for 1995-2004 in Germany, 1992-2001 in the UK and 1992-2000 in the US. 2 1992 data for France.
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C. Proﬁ  ts and the Proﬁ  t Share
We noticed that oﬀ  shoring is one of the reasons behind the recent rise in the proﬁ  t share of national income 
observed across industrialized countries. Figure 11 however shows the ﬂ  ip side, which is the decline in the 
labor share. Note that the labor share in the U.S. has declined less than in other countries. Th   is is partly 
due to the fact that the large levels of CEO compensation in the U.S., including stock options, are oﬃ   cially 
counted in labor income.
A number of studies have conﬁ  rmed the role of oﬀ  shoring in changing the distribution of income 
between labor and capital. Most ﬁ  rm-level studies ﬁ  nd that oﬀ  shoring occurs when cost reductions can be 
achieved and are at least 40% of the labor cost.23 Focusing on the data for 2000-2003, Milberg et al. (2007) 
ﬁ  nd that oﬀ  shoring intensity is positively associated with sectoral proﬁ  t shares in the U.S.. A number of 
recent papers have taken up the question of trade and the proﬁ  t share at the aggregate level. Harrison (2002) 
studies the relationship between trade openness and functional distribution of income across a large number 
of countries and ﬁ  nds that (contrary to the prediction of Heckscher-Ohlin theory) openness is generally 
associated with a lower share of labor in national income. Harrison concludes that “rising trade shares and 
exchange rate crises reduce labor’s share, while capital controls and government spending increase labor’s 
share.” A study by the IMF (2005) ﬁ  nds that oﬀ  shoring is a small, but signiﬁ  cant negative factor in the 
determination of the labor share of income for a group of OECD countries. In this study, three aspects of 
globalization (related to prices, oﬀ  shoring, and immigration) combined to play a large role in explaining the 
declining labor share. Th   e study by Ellis and Smith (2007) ﬁ  nds no connection between openness and the 
proﬁ  t share, but links the rising proﬁ  t share to increased “churning” in the labor market. While the authors 
attribute this churning to technological change, it seems likely that it also results from some of the indirect 
eﬀ  ects of globalization discussed below.
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Figure 11: 
Labor Compensation (in percentage of GDP)
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: OECD Annual National Accounts Statistics.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  21
It is important to recognize that the rise in income inequality (between labor and capital) is not in-
consistent with the theory depicted in Figure 10. As Mann (2003) shows, oﬀ  shoring may lead to positive net 
employment growth provided eﬃ   ciency gains from oﬀ  shoring are shared between consumers and producers 
and both these channels promote investment. Th   e problem is that the increase in proﬁ  t share has not gener-
ally resulted in higher rates of investment. In fact, as proﬁ  t shares of national income increased, domestic 
investment has fallen, as can be seen in Figure 12.
Th   ere are a number of explanations for the decline in domestic investment. Th   e simple fact is that 
less domestic investment is needed when signiﬁ  cant portions of the production process (goods and services) 
are moved oﬀ  shore. Th   us decline in domestic investment of industrialized countries goes hand in hand with 
rise in investment rates of countries hosting oﬀ  shoring activities, such as China (Figure 12). 
An associated phenomenon, also shown in Figure 10, is the leakage of proﬁ  ts to the ﬁ  nancial system. 
According to a number of recent studies, the decline in investment spending in the corporate sector is also 
tied with the shift in corporate strategy occurring in the 1980s, when the pressure on management was to 
“downsize” the corporation and “distribute” proﬁ  ts back to shareholders at a greater pace. Th   is process of ﬁ  -
nancialization that occurred in the non-ﬁ  nancial corporate sector was supported by the possibility of moving 
operations abroad through foreign direct investment and arm’s-length subcontracting and focusing increas-
ingly on “core competence,” a process that allowed corporate managers to reduce domestic investment in 
order to meet shareholder demands for improvements in shareholder value. Stockhammer (2004) documents 
a marked increase in the share of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations’ value added going to interest and dividends 
since the late 1970s in the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany. In a ﬁ  rm-level study of the U.S. non-ﬁ  nan-
cial corporate sector, Orhangazi, O. (2008) ﬁ  nds a similar relation between ﬁ  nancialization and investment. 
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Figure 12:
Gross Capital Formation (in percentage of GDP)
Source: Authors’ illustrations. Data: UN DESA Statistics Division and UNCTAD GlobStat Database.2 2   DESA Working Paper No. 87
occurs as the share of investment out of proﬁ  ts falls and the payment of dividends and the purchase of share 
buybacks rises (see Figure 13).24
D. Job Displacement and Earnings Replacement
Th   ere are a variety of ways of studying job loss resulting from international trade. One of these focuses on 
old-fashioned direct import competition, that is on the employment eﬀ  ects of a change in net exports, where 
these employment eﬀ  ects are typically based on a comparison of actual employment with employment levels 
that would have occurred if the trade balance (relative to GDP) had remained unchanged. Sachs and Shatz 
(1994) had found that trade reduced U.S. manufacturing employment by 5.7% in 1990, and Wood (1994) 
put the ﬁ  gure at 10.8% for all developed countries, with a relatively larger share of the decline borne by 
unskilled workers in both studies. In general, these studies ﬁ  nd employment gains where net exports rise 
and employment losses where they fall. Th   ese studies focus almost exclusively on the manufacturing sector. 
In our sample, for the period 1991-2005, the U.S., the U.K. and France experienced increases in their trade 
deﬁ  cit in manufacturing, while Denmark, Japan and especially Germany had improvements. Th  e  deteriora-
24   It would appear that the relationship between oﬀ  shoring and ﬁ  nancialization is not just in one direction. A study of 
U.K. and Danish retail ﬁ  rms shows that the ﬁ  nancial pressures on the U.K. ﬁ  rms led to much stricter conditions being 
imposed on foreign suppliers of U.K. ﬁ  rms compared to Danish ﬁ  rms. U.K. retailers were more aggressive in seeking 
low-cost suppliers and in pressuring suppliers to reduce prices. See Palpacuer et al. (2005) and Gibbon (2002).
Figure 13: 

















































Source: Schedule Z.1 of the Flow of Funds Account from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank online database.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  23
tion has been the greatest for the U.S., and Scott (2007) calculates that the decline in net exports between 
2001 and 2006 cost the U.S. the equivalent of 1.8 million jobs.25 
Another line of research looks at the employment eﬀ  ects of foreign direct investment. Th  is  however 
captures only a portion of the eﬀ  ect of oﬀ  shoring, because much of it takes place at arm’s length. Th  e  results 
proved to be ambiguous. Muendler and Becker (2006) in a study of Germany, Brainard and Riker (2001) 
in a study of the U.S. and Fors and Kokko (1999) in a study of Sweden, found a substitution eﬀ  ect between 
employment at home and in foreign aﬃ   liates. Desai, Foley and Hines (2005) and Borga (2005) found com-
plementarities between employment at home and in aﬃ   liates for U.S. transnational corporations. Harrison 
and McMillan (2007) ﬁ  nd that the eﬀ  ect of FDI on U.S. employment depends on whether the investment 
is horizontal or vertical. Horizontal FDI, seeking to serve foreign markets, is found to reduce U.S. labor 
demand, while vertical FDI, which seeks to reduce costs, increases the demand for labor.
An important measure of economic insecurity is the ability of workers displaced by trade to ﬁ  nd a 
new job and not suﬀ  er a loss in earnings. Kletzer (2001) has done the most extensive analysis of the re-
employment rate and replacement wage for workers displaced as the result of foreign trade. In a study of the 
U.S. from 1979-1999 she found that earnings losses from job dislocation are large and persistent over time. 
Speciﬁ  cally, she found that 64.8 per cent of manufacturing workers displaced during 1979-1999 and one-
fourth of those reemployed suﬀ  ered earnings declines greater than 30%. For workers displaced from non-
manufacturing sectors the situation is very similar: 69 percent found reemployment, and 21 per cent suﬀ  ered 
pay cuts of 30 per cent or more. 
OECD (2005) did a similar study for 14 European countries for 1994-2001 and found that re-
employment rates in Europe were lower than in the U.S., but a much lower share of workers had earnings 
losses greater than 30% upon reemployment and 46 percent of workers had no earnings losses or were earn-
ing more than before displacement. Table 10 compares the U.S. and European situations for trade-displaced 
workers.
25   Note that the author attributes 11% of this job loss to Wal-Mart’s imports alone.
Table 10:
Adjustment Costs of Trade-Displaced Workers (Percent)





















Manufacturing 57.0 45.8 6.5 64.8 35.0 25.0
High-International-Competition 51.8 44.0 5.4 63.4 36.0 25.0
Medium-International-Competition 58.7 45.7 7.0 65.4 34.0 25.0
Low-International-Competition 59.6 47.3 6.8 66.8 38.0 26.0
Services and Utilitiesb 57.2 49.6 8.4 69.1 41.0 21.0
All sectors 57.3 47.1 7.5 - - -
Source: OECD (2005), Table 1.3, p. 45; and Kletzer (2001), Table D2, p. 102.
a) OECD Secretariat estimates based on data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.  b) Services for Europe.2 4   DESA Working Paper No. 87
E. Trade versus Technology: Skill-Biased Labor Demand Shifts
Labor economists studying rising income inequality in industrialized countries over the past 15-20 years 
often see the explanation in technological change. According to this view, the introduction of information 
technology (IT) and IT-enabled tasks introduced a bias in the demand for higher-skill workers. Th   e result of 
such “skills-biased technological change” was to raise income inequality, as the wages of higher-paid work-
ers increased faster than those of lower-paid workers who experienced smaller gains or even, in some cases, a 
decline in wages.26
Responding to the empirical ﬁ  ndings, many international trade economists have reformulated the 
traditional two factor model of trade to allow distinction between labor of high and low skill.27 Th  ese  models 
generally predict that trade liberalization would raise the relative demand for skilled labor in industrialized 
countries and thus raise the ratio of wages of skilled labor to wages of unskilled labor. Th  ese  predictions 
are consistent with the observed increasing trends in income inequality in these countries.28 In sum, trade 
liberalization and technological change both can contribute to the rising wage inequality in industrialized 
countries. Th   e debate concerns their relative role in the phenomenon. 
Wood (1995, p. 57) ﬁ  nds that that “trade is the main cause of the problems of unskilled workers.” 
(See also Wood 1994). As the main force driving the process, he identiﬁ  es increasing specialization of indus-
trialized countries in capital-intensive manufacturers, while developing countries specialized in the produc-
tion of labor-intensive goods. Wood estimates that between 1980 and 1994, 75% of the increased wage 
inequality in the U.S. was due to trade.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999 and 2001) follow up the above results with a series of studies 
applying the extended trade model to the case of oﬀ  shoring. Th  ey  ﬁ  nd that changes in oﬀ  shoring between 
1979 and 1990 explain between 15 and 40 percent of the rise in the wages of high-skilled workers relative 
to the wages of low-skilled workers in that period. In a study of manufacturing oﬀ  shoring in the UK for the 
period 1970-1983, Anderton and Brenton (1999) ﬁ  nd that trade accounted for 40% of the rise in the skilled 
labor share of labor income. Geishecker (2002) in a study of Germany in the 1990s ﬁ  nds that oﬀ  shoring had 
a signiﬁ  cant negative impact on the demand for low-skilled workers, explaining about 19% to 24% of the 
overall decline in the relative demand for low-skilled labor. Head and Ries (2000) estimate a similar model 
for Japan and ﬁ  nd “a strong positive correlation between the change in the ﬁ  rm’s non-production wage share 
and a ﬁ  rm’s share of employment in low-income countries.” (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001, p. 28). In their 
summary paper on the issue, Feenstra and Hanson (2001) ﬁ  nd that oﬀ  shoring accounted for 15-24% of the 
rise in the “non-production wage share” (i.e. the share of wages going to higher-skilled workers), while com-
puter services and other high-tech services account for 8% to 31% of the shift to non-production labor. 
Further research could not actually resolve the debate concerning relative roles of technology and 
trade in wage inequality rise. Also, there has been a debate about the timing of the technological change.29 
By some accounts, inequality began to rise well before new technology was integrated into production 
26   For some early empirical analysis, see Berman et al. (1994) on the U.S. and Machin and Manning (1996) on the U.K..
27   Wood (1994, 1995) pioneered this eﬀ  ort. He argued that capital could be ignored since with high international 
mobility had little diﬀ  erential eﬀ  ect across countries.
28   According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade liberalization should beneﬁ  t an economy’s abundant factor relative 
to its scarce factor. In a world of high- and low-skill labor, the industrialized countries were clearly relatively abundant 
in skilled labor and thus could expect to see the returns to skill rising in relative terms.
29   See Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007) section 5 for a discussion.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  25
processes. Inequality actually fell during the late 1990s when the IT boom was the strongest. It also became 
clear that trade and technological change are inter-connected, and increasingly so as global supply chains 
developed. For example, Wood (1995, p. 62) notes that “the pace and direction of technical change may be 
inﬂ  uenced by trade…So, however one looks at it, trade and new technology are intertwined: no story that 
excludes one or the other of them is likely to be the whole story.” 
Despite these diﬃ   culties, the increased magnitude of, and public concern over, oﬀ  shoring have 
spurred much empirical research on the labor market eﬀ  ect of oﬀ  shoring in the 1980s and 1990s. Table 11 
presents a summary of recent research, which covers studies of the U.S., the U.K., Germany and a recent 
study of all OECD countries, and covering both the manufacturing and service sectors. Th   ese recent studies 
by and large support earlier ﬁ  ndings: oﬀ  shoring in the production of goods and services leads to the rise of 
employment and wages of high-skilled labor and fall in the employment and wages of low-skilled labor.
Some recent research has focused separately on oﬀ  shoring of services and examined its eﬀ  ect on 
overall employment. Th   is focus is important because it gets away from the narrow theoretical conﬁ  nes of the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the diﬃ   culty of testing it, and asks a more general question.30 Th  eir  results 
are not fully conclusive, but they broadly indicate that across the OECD, oﬀ  shoring of services has led to 
reductions in overall employment. See, for example, Amiti and Wei (2004, 2006). Similarly, Schöller (2007a, 
2007c) oﬀ  er evidence of negative inﬂ  uence of service oﬀ  shoring on German employment between 1991 
and 2000. OECD (2007b) measures the eﬀ  ects of oﬀ  shoring for 12 OECD countries, showing signiﬁ  cantly 
negative eﬀ  ect of goods and services oﬀ  shoring on manufacturing and service employment. 
Th   e perceptions of a strong link between globalization and economic insecurity cited at the begin-
ning of this paper are likely to be driven both by current reality and by predictions about the future. A 
number of recent studies predict a signiﬁ  cant expansion of services oﬀ  shoring. For example, Blinder (2005, 
2007a, 2007b) has done a detailed analysis of the U.S. labor force, looking especially at jobs in services and 
the extent to which they are “personally delivered” or “impersonally delivered.” Personally-delivered services 
cannot be delivered electronically, such as child care or garbage collection. Impersonally-delivered services 
are those that can be delivered electronically without a signiﬁ  cant loss of quality. Th   ese would include travel 
reservations and computer support (Blinder 2007a, p. 4). Blinder estimates that 30 to 40 million current 
jobs (22 to 29 percent of the current American workforce) are likely to fall into the category of impersonally-
delivered services, and hence potentially subject to future oﬀ  shoring. Blinder’s analysis is notable not just 
because the potential labor market displacement is large, but because the displacement aﬀ  ects all skill levels 
of the U.S. labor force. Blinder sees the potential wave of oﬀ  shoring as driving a new industrial revolution, 
so that “the sectoral and occupational compositions of the U.S. workforce are likely to be quite diﬀ  erent a 
generation or two from now. When that future rolls around, only a small minority of U.S. jobs will still be 
oﬀ  shorable; the rest will have already moved oﬀ   shore (p. 27).” Blinder’s analysis shows that the distinction 
between high-skill versus low-skill labor that characterizes most of the research to date, may be much less 
relevant in the near future.
30   Th   e theory has not gone un-criticized, both on grounds of relevance (see Samuelson, 2004) and on the grounds of the 
diﬃ   culty of measuring high-skill and low-skill labour (see Howell, 2002), and its weak predictive power for the case of 
developing (low-skill abundant) countries see, for example, (Berg, 2006).2 6   DESA Working Paper No. 87
F. Increase in the Elasticity of the Demand for Labor
Rodrik (1997) and others have noted that greater openness to international trade would also raise the elas-
ticity of labor demand with respect to both domestic and foreign wages. Th   is increased sensitivity of labor 
demand to both domestic and foreign wage movements is another result of rise of global supply chains and 
oﬀ  shoring. Anderson and Gascon (2007, p. 2) describe the situation well:
Table 11:
Labor Market Eff  ects of Off  shoring: Survey of Literature
Source Country Industry Sectors Years Eff  ects of Off  shoring
Dependent Variable: Employment Goods Services Overall
Amiti and Wei (2004, 2006)1 United States Mfg. 450 1992-2001 + -
96 + +
Amiti and Wei (2005)1 United Kingdom Mfg. 69 1995-2001 + /  - +
Service 9 - -
Schöller (2007a)1 Germany Mfg. 36 1991-2000 - -
Schöller (2007c)1 Germany Mfg. 35 1995-2004 - -






Dependent Variable: High-Skill Employment Goods Services Overall
Feenstra and Hanson (1996)2 United States Mfg. 450 1977-1993 +
Feenstra and Hanson (1999)1 United States Mfg. 450 1979-1990 +
Falk and Koebel (2002)2 Germany Mfg. 26 1978-1990 no ev.
Ekholm and Hakkala (2006)2 Sweden Mfg. 20 1995-2000 +6
+7
Dependent Variable: Low-Skill Employment Goods Services Overall
Falk and Koebel (2002)2 Germany Mfg. 26 1978-1990 no ev.
Geishecker (2002)2 Germany Mfg. 22 1991-2000 -
Strauss-Kahn (2003)3 France Mfg. not rep. 1977-1993 -
Hijzen, Görg, and Heine (2005)2 United Kingdom Mfg. 50 1982-1996 -
Ekholm and Hakkala (2006)2 Sweden Mfg. 20 1995-2000 -8
Geishecker (2006)2 Germany Mfg. 23 1991-2000 -9
Schöller (2007b)1 Germany Mfg. 28 1991-2000 - -
Dependent Variable: High-Skill Wages Goods Services Overall
Feenstra and Hanson (1996)2 United States Mfg. 450 1977-1993 +
Feenstra and Hanson (1999)1 United States Mfg. 450 1979-1990 +
Geishecker and Görg (2004, 2007)4 Germany Mfg 21 1991-2000 +
Geishecker, Görg and Munch (2008)4 Germany Mfg not rep. 1991-2000 -9
United Kingdom Mfg not rep. 1992-2004 -9




Source: Authors’ illustration. 
1 imported inputs / total non-energy inputs
2 imported inputs from same sector / output 
3 vertical specialization
4 imported inputs / output
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“Traditionally, trade is thought of as exchanging diﬀ  erent goods across nations, not the shifting 
of production from one country to another, followed by return shipments back to the original 
country. For example, in the past, U.S. ﬁ  rms would export good x and import good y. In the New 
Economy, U.S. ﬁ  rms export the capital k needed to produce good x to a country with lower pro-
duction costs and then re import good x. Th   eoretically, disaggregating the value chain has allowed 
U.S. business to substitute cheaper foreign labor, increasing ﬁ  rms’ own price elasticity of demand 
for labor, raising the volatility of wages and employment, which increase worker insecurity.”
However, there have been very few estimates of the relationship between trade openness and the 
wage elasticity of labor demand. Slaughter (2001) studied U.S. manufacturing sector for the period of 1960-
1991 and found that the elasticity of demand rose for U.S. production workers (a proxy for lower-skill work-
ers) but not for non-production workers during this period. Th   e elasticity increase was the greatest in sectors 
that experienced the most oﬀ  shoring and technical change in the form of more computer related investment. 
Scheve and Slaughter (2004) ﬁ  nd that FDI is the key aspect of globalization that raises the elasticity of labor 
demand. In a study of outward FDI by U.K. ﬁ  rms, they ﬁ  nd that higher FDI is associated with higher elas-
ticity of labor demand and greater volatility of wages and employment
G. Th   reat of Job Loss and Wage Suppression
A less easily quantiﬁ  able channel through which globalization and especially oﬀ  shoring inﬂ  uence wages and 
job security is the threat by companies to move production overseas. Th   e following is how Freeman (1995, p. 
21) describes the phenomenon:
“It isn’t even necessary that the West import the toys. Th   e threat to import them or to move 
plants to less-developed countries to produce toys may suﬃ   ce to force low-skilled westerners to 
take a cut in pay to maintain employment. In this situation, the open economy can cause lower 
pay for low-skilled westerners even without trade.”
Th   e issue has received considerable attention from theorists, but there is little empirical analy-
sis.31 Bronfenbrenner (1997, 2000), studying the U.S. between 1993 and 1999, focuses more narrowly on 
unionization campaigns than on wages. She ﬁ  nds that a ﬁ  rm’s mobility did raise the credibility of the threat 
to move production oﬀ  shore, and it inﬂ  uenced the decision of workers regarding unionization .Th  e  study 
indicates that unionization drives have a much lower rate of success in ﬁ  rms with a credible threat of mo-
bility than in those considered immobile. Similarly, Choi (2001) looked at detailed outward foreign direct 
investment by U.S. manufacturers and found that increased outward FDI was associated with lower wage 
premiums for union members during the period 1983-1996.
5. Conclusion and Prospects for the Future
Th   is paper has shown that the new wave of globalization has raised worker vulnerability in industrialized 
countries by increasing the likelihood of getting unemployed, reducing employment and wage growth, 
lowering the overall labor share of national income, and raising inequality between high- and low-skilled 
workers. But vulnerability does not translate directly into economic insecurity. Th   is depends on households’ 
capacity to cope with the risk of sudden loss of employment and income and on national policies to absorb 
such risks. Th   e decline in household saving and massive growth in household debt reﬂ  ect in part the dwin-
dling ability of households to cope with employment and income shocks. 
31   See Burke and Epstein (2001) for an overview and Rodrik (1999) for a game-theoretic approach.2 8   DESA Working Paper No. 87
Diﬀ  erent industrialized countries have implemented very diﬀ  erent sets of policies to cope with the 
situation arising from the new wave of globalization, and we have identiﬁ  ed ﬁ  ve “models.” At one extreme is 
the Anglo-Saxon model represented by the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon economies with lax hiring and ﬁ  ring 
regulations, low unemployment beneﬁ  ts, and very limited spending on active labor market policies. At the 
other extreme is the Rhineland model, represented by France and Germany, who have relatively high levels 
of employment protection, large unemployment beneﬁ  ts, and signiﬁ  cant spending on active labor market 
programs. Denmark and a few other countries seem to have combined elements the two, devising a model 
of “ﬂ  exicurity,” characterized by labor market ﬂ  exibility, high replacement income programs for the unem-
ployed, and extensive active labor market programs. In recent years, France and Germany seem to be moving 
toward the ﬂ  exicurity model, but are still far from reaching the Danish practice of this model. 
Th   e analysis of oﬀ  shoring presented in this paper indicates that ﬂ  exicurity, as a way of managing 
state-market relations in a globalized economy, is probably not suﬃ   cient for ensuring economic security in 
the long run. What is instead required is re-channeling of the gains from oﬀ  shoring away from ﬁ  nance and 
towards re-investment in the domestic economy. Tighter labor markets driven not by unsustainable consum-
er debt but by productivity-enhancing private investment is the long-term key to “sharing the gains” from 
globalization.
Th   is conclusion raises a question about the relationship between national policy and international 
competitiveness. It is often heard that greater state-provided social protection constitutes a cost to producers 
that reduces international competitiveness. Th   e evidence, however, indicates that the opposite may be true. 
Th   e provision of greater social protection does not unambiguously reduce a country’s export competitiveness 
and in some cases may even increase it. In a study of OECD countries over the period 1978-1995, Milberg 
and Houston (2005) ﬁ  nd that there are multiple paths to export competitiveness for industrialized coun-
tries. On the one hand there is the “high-road” relying on innovation, high productivity, and high levels of 
compensation and job security resulting from labor-management cooperation and state support for eco-
nomic security. On the other hand is the “low road,” in which productivity growth hinges on intense conﬂ  ict 
between labor and management rooted in job insecurity and a weak role for the state in guaranteeing social 
protection.32 Th   is conclusion also applies to the six countries studied in this paper. Denmark and Germany, 
two countries with greater state intervention in sharing the burden of insecurity, have increased their trade 
surpluses considerably over the past 15 years, while the Anglo-Saxon countries have experienced massive 
trade deﬁ  cit. 
Over the past 15 years, the new wave of globalization has led to a rise in the share of proﬁ  ts in the 
national income and decline in the share of wages, increasing inequality in the society. Unless reversed, this 
tendency toward polarization is likely to get stronger as globalization gradually engulfs more sections of the 
labor force, including high-skilled and service sector workers, and thus spreads insecurity to wider sections of 
the population. 
In industrialized democracies such polarization and widespread insecurity may call into question 
the very merit of liberal trade policies and the eﬃ   cacy of the traditional (Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland) ar-
rangements between states and markets. Th   e response may take a variety of forms, including a dangerous 
protectionist backlash. It is therefore urgent to formulate policies and erect an institutional structure that can 
address eﬀ  ectively the challenges raised by the new wave of globalization. 
32   Belloc (2004) ﬁ  nds a similar result.Globalization, Offshoring and Economic Insecurity ...  29
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